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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONNA B. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15163
)

ORVAL WRIGHT,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Defendant and Respondent.)

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§30-3-5 to modify a Divorce Decree, divesting the former
wife of title to the matrimonial residence and vesting it in
both parties; requiring the sale of said home and the equal
division of the equity to the parties hereto; and also
requiring the former wife to pay an indebtedness secured by
the home but incurred for the benefit of the former husband's
separate property.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The modification was granted, and motions to reopen and amend were denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the order requiring
her to make payments on her home and reversal of the judg-
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Ori_ginal Actl,on
This case was commenced on July 29, 1965, by the
filing of a Complaint and Waiver in the Fifth Judicial
District, with appellant Donna B. Wright as plaintiff.
Ellis J. Pickett, her husband's attorney, was listed as he:
counsel.

The Complaint sought a divorce and the effectua-

tion by the court of a Property Settlement Agreement. R.1.
Though the Property Settlement Agreement had been executed
by the parties contemporaneously with the Complaint, on
July 28, 1965, i t was not filed until September 2, 1965.
R. 4. The agreement provided that the parties' home "would
be set aside for Mrs. Wright our children."

A mortgage on

the house, incurred prior to the divorce to finance a
mountain cabin was to be paid by Mr. Wright "until the
mortgage indebtedness has been paid in full" (emphasis
added). This indebtedness amounted to $7, 729.64 when the
divorce was granted.

Mr. Wright kept the mountain cabin

in question and after the divorce sold the same retaining
the proceeds of this sale.
Mrs. Wright was also given an automobile, and
promised $200 per month child support.

She also received

four lots in a local undeveloped subdivision, with Mr.
Wright to pay the mortgage on those lots.

-2-

Hr. Wright rece:
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all the remaining lots in the subdivision (approximately
20), all contract receivables on lots previously sold
and
All of the property in Sections 10, 11
and 12 in Township 39 South, Range 11
West, SLB&M, as described in that mortgage dated June 25, 1963, and recorded
in Book S-44 of Mortgages on pages 107 to
109 inclusive, File No. 119243 of the
Records of Washington County, Utah.
which was approximately 1,100 acres.

The Property Settle-

ment Agreement did not provide for disposition of the
mountain cabin referred to above, another small house, a
Jeep, a truck, two boats, diamonds, guns, cameras, and
other personalty which Mr. Wright retained.
Also, the property settlement did not note,
and the court was unaware that the parties had exchanged
numerous deeds to property two days before executing the
Complaint, Waiver, and Agreement.

(There may also have

been other concealed assets, but Appellant's discovery on
this issue was denied by the lower court.

See Argument

Denial of Discovery, at 26, infra.
The matter was heard October 8, 1965 (R.6.) by
Judge C. Nelson Day, and the divorce was granted.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Interlocutory
Decree of Divorce were entered October 27, 1965. R.8.
The property settlement was adopted by the Court and the
decree stated that Mrs. Wright was "awarded the home in
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Hur:::-icane ... for herself and cinor children," while Mr.
\lri;hc was ordered to pay the mortgage debt in full.

Order to Show Cause
AtteI'.lpting to find a way to satisfy his obligations, Hr. Wright filed an Affidavit in the divorce action
on February 22, 1971, claiming that the home should be
awarded to himself on the ground that the minor children ho
reached their majority, that

~!rs.

Wright had remarried, ana

that the house was not then used by Mrs. Wright.

R.13.

~

Order to Show Cause was issued the 11th day of May, 1971, i
Judge J. Harlan Burns.

R.15.

Mrs. Wright responded through her attorneys
Douglas Pike and John W. Palmer, moving to dismiss the Ord::
to Sho~., Cause and filing an opposing affidavit.
20.

R.16, 17,

She also moved to enforce arrear ages in support paymec:

R.22.
A hearing was set for October 12, 1971, (R.31),
but vacated to allow Mrs. Wright discovery on the relative
values of property each party mmed.
36.

See R.32, 34, 35 and

In the order vacating the hearing date, the judge,

without hearing any evidence of changed circumstances,
ordered Mrs. Wright to make the monthly payments of $110.Ui:
on the unrelated mortgage financing Mr. Wright's mountain
cabin until a Jo.earing on the r:erits o

. red.

Froc1 the
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decree until that date, Mr. Wright had paid $3,778.47
on the mortgage debt.

There remained to be paid the sum

of $3,951.17.
Mrs. Wright's discovery as to property values
was allowed, but its scope was severely limited.
The judge felt that Mr. Wright's income from 1965 to 1970,
and property values and relative ownership in 1965 were immaterial, struck several of the interrogatories, allowing
only those pertaining to Mr. Wright's present property
ownership and income.

T (October 8, 1971) 8:3-23; R.36.

Both parties submitted memoranda on the relevant
law. Mrs. Wright alleged that the property settlment
part of the Decree was not modifiable.

R.18.

Mr. Wright

recognized this contention but claimed "that the District
Court does retain jurisdiction over a ... property settlement agreement ... " and therefore could modify a property
settlement.

R.28.
Interim Failure to Proceed

In May, 1973, after over a year's delay since
the completion of discovery, with no further prosecution
by Mr. Wright, Mrs. Wright filed a Demand for Non-Jury
Trial Setting through her new attorney, Robert L. Gardner.
R.49, ~r. Wright had no desire to proceed because
Mrs. Wright was making the monthly payments on his debt.
The date set for the hearing was vacated at the insistance
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..,
of Mr. Wright's counsel.

R.54, 55.

was also vacated at his request.

The second date set

R.56, 58.

Finally~

October 1, 1973, the matter was heard by Judge A. John
. 1
Ruggeri.

Hearing of Order to Show Cause
Mr. Gardner's statement of the record recites th,
the allegations in support of Mr. Wright's claim to the
house were very limited.
There was nothing supporting his position
except a very limited statement that the
Plaintiff did not live in the home, the
minor children were of legal age, and
the Plaintiff was renting the home. There
was no contention by the Defendant that he
claimed an interest in the home from the
time of the divorce or that he needed the
house or for financial reasons that he
needed money. Affidavit of Attorney, p.2.
The evidence presented was likewise very limited.
The Defendant took the stand and in substance
testified that he lived in Hurricane, Utah,
had remarried, and had children by his
present wife; that the Plaintiff had
moved to .Las Vegas, Nevada, and remarried;
that the two children of these parties were
now of age and not living with the
Plaintiff, and that in view of the
foregoing, the court should award him
an interest in the home or that the
home be sold and the proceeds divided.
Affidavit of Attorney, p.3.
1 The transcript of this hearing is unavailable. See Affr
davit of Counsel, Appendix to this brief. Appellants pre·
pared a statement 6f the proceedings and served it on~~
counsel pursuant to Rule 75(m), U.R.C.P. Respondent havlil,
I!lade no obJ. ection, the District Court made no settlement at:
'
. ~~
approval. The statement of Mr. Gardner appeai;s in
berc
See Affidavit of Former Attorney of Record, filed Novem
~], in the Supreme Court.
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Mr. Garner regarded the evidence presented as
totally insufficient to support modification of the property
settlement, and did not believe recovery would be possible.
Based upon what appeared to be a total lack
of any competent evidence that would justify
the redistribution of the title to the home
and based upon the property settlement agreement that was part of the file, I did not see
anything that the Plaintiff was required
to respond to and therefore Plaintiff did
not testify concerning the divorce, the
property settlement, nor her present
circumstances.
The judge, however, adopted Mr. Wright's contention that
property settlements were modifiable.
To the great surprise of both myself
and my client, the Judge ordered the
home appraised, sold, and after payment
of an existing mortgage, the proceeds
divided equally between the parties.
Affidavit of Attorney, p.3.
Mr. Gardner discussed the matter with his
client immediately after the October 1, 1973 hearing,,and
discovered (1) that Mr. Pickett who had originally represented Mrs. Wright was actually Mr. Wright's attorney, (2)
that deeds had been prepared and exchanged as part of the
property settlement, (3) that a large amount of property
was not dealt with in the settlement agreement, (4) that
her understanding was that the deeds meant she could not
have the house taken away, and (5) that the mortgage debt
was not related to the house but to property of Mr. Wright.
See Affidavit of Attorney, page 3.
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It was at this time that Mr. Gardner learned
that on July 29, 1965, the day the divorce decree was
filed Mr. Wright had delivered to Mrs. Wright a Quit
Claim Deed to the home and real property at issue in ~G
lawsuit.

R.66.

This deed was recorded July 29, 1965.

On its face the deed conveys the property to "Donna B.
Wright, wife of Gran tor, as her sole and separate propert
R.64.

This Quit Claim Deed was given in exchange for

various deeds from Mrs. Wright to Mr. Wright conveying
the remainder of the parties' realty to Mr. Wright.

The 1

deeds were executed, delivered and recorded by Mr. Wright
prior to the date of the filing of the Complaint for dive
R.63.
Motion to Re-Open
The day following the hearing Mr. Gardner made
motion to re-open pursuant to Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P., alle1
the newly discovered deed as new evidence to convince the
court that modification of a vested record interest wu
improper.

See R.84.

On October 15, 1973, he filed an

affidavit of Mrs. Wright setting forth the execution of
deeds and her understanding that "it was the intention of
both the Plaintiff and Defendant at the time of the divor
that the complete and absolute title to the home was give
·
·ff ... " R . 63 .
t o the Pl ainti

A~Ltached was a copy of the de
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to the hoDe, and a letter froD Attorney Pickett referring
to the exchange of deeds.

R.64 and 65.

Attorney Gardner

also filed a written motion to re-open on the ground of
ne•.·1ly discovered evidence.

The motion was heard on

October 17, 1973.

R.66, 63. The transcript of this hear2
ing is also unavailable, but a minute entry indicates
the judge renained convinced that property settlements were

modifiable and the motion to re-open was denied.

R.68,

77' 78.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Judg~ent

were then entered.

Judge Ruggeri specifically

found that the title and disposition of the home were still
before the Court. R.69.

Further, it was found that Mr. Wright

no longer had a duty of support, and that the use of the home
by Hrs. Wright and the children had ended'.

The Court noted

the inequity of the previous Order requiring Mrs. \fright to
I'lake the mortgage payments, but felt it was powerless to
change that Order.

R.70.

The Court ordered the home sold

and the proceeds divided between the parties.

R.70.

Motion for a New Trial
Hr. Gardner promptly moved for a new trial on the
ground that there was insufficient evidence of change in circumstance to warrant a divestiture of title to real property.
R. 72.

The court, several months later in May, 1974, filed a

memorandum decision setting out grounds for and denying the
motion to re-open.

The court's action was specifically with-

2

See Affidavit attached hereto in Appendix, page vi
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out prejudice to other procedures to establish the deed.

1

Motion to Re-O~E_ Gra!!_!.:=.!_ anj_ De_!.lied_
In January, 1975, Judge Ruggeri reversed hims

,

e.11

and granted the motion to re-open, and agreed to receive
into evidence testimony and documents touching upon the
ownership and disposition of the property.

R. 85.

Mr.

Gardner promptly filed a Petition to Modify the Order modi
fying the Decree.

R. 86.

The Petition recited the evidenc,

of deeds, discovered after the hearing, and noted the dis·
parity of the property division in favor of the husband.
Mr. Wright's counsel responded with an Objection to Petiti.
to Modify (R. 80.), and the Court sustained the objection,
again without prejudice. R.107, again reversing itself.
Motion to Amend Order
Within a week of the hearing sustaining the
objection to the Petition to Modify, Mr. Gardner filed a
Motion for Leave to File a Petition to Amend pursuant to
Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. R.92.

An accompanying memorandum

explained the legal basis for the petition.
No action was taken by the court.

R. 94, 99.
In late 1976,

Attorney Gardner withdrew as counsel for Mrs. Wright, and
early in 1977 counsel for Mr. Wright filed a Notice to
Appoint Successor Attorney.

R.110.

Present counsel for Mrs. Wright entered his
appearance,

(R. 113) and Judge Burns referred the case to
-10-
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Judge Ballif.

Judge Ballif set a hearing for April 4 to

consider vacating the Order sustaining the objection to the
Petition to ~fodify, and notified counsel that they should be
prepared to proceed to trial on April 5.

R.111.

Judge Ballif heard the parties on April 4, 1977,
and entered an order the following day "making the Order of
the Court dated July 30, 1975 ... final. .. "

R. ll5.

He

expressly noted his reluctance to affect the decision of
another district judge.

A Notice of Appeal was timely

filed and this appeal was perfected.

R.116 et.seq.

In the course of these proceedings, after the
Judgraent of Judge Ruggeri executed October 19, 1973
ordering the mortgage satisfied out of the proceeds from
the sale of the home (R.73), the last $951.17 of the
mortgage indebtedness was completely paid off by Mrs. Wright.
It should be noted that the Motion for New Trial
dated October 23, 1973, (R.72). and the Motion for Leave to
File a Petition to .Amend pursuant to Rule 60(b) (R.92) have
never been disposed of, according to the record. The most
recent judge to hear this case below ordered that no other
pleadings be filed except a notice of appeal, and rather
than be found in contempt, appellant has filed this appeal
rather than seek resolution of those motions.
ARGIDIENT
POINT I.

THE DECREE MODIFICATIONS WERE CONTRARY TO LAW
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The lower court made two modifications of t~
divorce decree.

First, it ordered Mrs. Wright to make th,

mortgage payments, covering the house, and second, it
ordered the house sold, with proceeds to be divided evenli
between the parties.

Prior to these orders, Mr. Wright h2

made all the mortgage payments and the title to the house
was vested solely in Mrs. Wright's name, as her separate
property.

R.64.
Apparently, the court based its actions on Utah

Code Ann. 30-3-5,

feeling that the statute

authoriz~~

acts.
When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the children
property and parties, and the maintenance of
the parties and children, as may be equitable.
The court shall have continuing jurisdictiion.
to make such subsequent changes or new orders
with respect to the support and maintenance
of the arties, the custod of the children
an t e support an maintenance, or t e
distribution of the property as shall be
reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights
of parents, grandparents and other relatives
shall take into consideration the welfare of
the child.
(emphasis added).
This statute, in different forms but with simila:
substance, has been in effect since March 6, 1852, when tr
Territorial Legislature enacted Utah's first divorce
statutes.

See Whitmore v. Hardin, 3 Utah 121, 131, 1P.

(1881) and C.L. 1888 §2606, column note.

4

That enactment

provided for modification of divorce decrees:
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[\J] hen it shall appear to the court at a
future time that it would be for the
interest of the parties concerned that a
change s~ould be effected in regard to the
former disposal of children or distribution
of property, the court shall have power
to make such change as will be conductive
~o the best interests of all parties concerned.
Whitmore, Id. at 131.

A related statute provided for modification of
decrees respecting children, property and maintenance "in
those respects when circumstances render them expedient."
Id at 132.

Similar statutes have been in effect since the

territorial provision.

See C.L. 1876 §1155; C.L. 1888

§2606; R.S. 1398 §1212; C.L. 1909 §1212; C.L. 1917 §3000;
R.S. 1933 §40-3-5; Utah Code Ann (1943) §40-3-5.

While the present statute clearly allows modification
of periodic support and maintenance provisions, the award
of real property and the appurtenant house to Mrs. Wright
was not such a provision, and therefore was not modifiable.
Also, Mr. Wright's obligation to pay the mortgage was modified without hearing any evidence of changed circumstances,
which is contrary to case law developed under the statute.
Both modifications were, therefore, contrary to law.

A.

The Ownership of the House, Given in
Property Settlement, was not Modifiable
It has been unanimously held by all state courts

that have considered the question that property settlements in divorce decrees are not modifiable.

See

Tuttle v. Tuttle, 38 Cal. 2d 419, 240 P.2d 587 (1952);
Kuckenberg v. Kuckenberg, 252 Or. 647, 452 P.2d
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305 (1969); Moore v. Moore, 33 hlyo.

23J, 237 P.235 (1 925 )

This contrasts sharply with the companion
rule that provision for alimony can be Qodified.

24 An.

Jcir _

2d D'

~

and Separation §941 (1966)_
The reasons for the distinction are sound.

As

stated by a leading cor:u::tentator:
None of the policy reasons favorina
modification apply to a division of
property.
It should be final when
made ... Clark, Domestic Relations §
14.9 (1968).
In many of Utah's sister states, statutes make
property settlements unmodifiable except upon grounds
allowing modification of any other civil judgr::ent.

See

Appendix, Laws of the Western States on Modification of
Divorce Decrees.

Arizona, Colorado, Montana,

~fovada,

and

Washington are among this group.
In spite of the clear rule, however, respondent
successfully argued below that property settlements may
be modifiable under the Utah statute.

He cited Doe v. Doe

1+8 Utah 200, 158 P. 781 (1916) for the proposition that

the District Court retains jurisdiction to modify the deci
of divorce with respect to the distribution of properey.
R. 27.

The court's statement in that case, however, was

merely prospective - that its order could be modified in
the future.

The decree in Doe was expressly worded to

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided-14by the Institute of Museum and Library Servi
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

place the hooe in !=ru~, thus giving third parties notice
of the other spouse's interest, and clearly reflecting an
award of mere use of the house, not absolute title.
Though Doe was clearly distinguishable from this
situation in which absolute title has been given to the
wife, (R.64) the lower court adopted Mr. Wright's claim of
modifiability specifically finding that the title and
disposition of the home were still before the court.

R.69.

The issue of modifiability of property settlements is
central to this appeal.

As Mr. Wright's counsel has stated

[I]f, in fact, that property settlemfint
is unmodifiable ... I would suppose that
the Supreme Court should decide that and
tell us i f we are wrong. T (April 4, 1977)
20:19-23.
Appellant notes that an encyclopedic authority
cites Utah as the only jurisdiction allowing property
settlement modifications due to the broad language of our
statute.

27B C.J.S. Divorce §300(4)a note 62.50 (1959).

However, the case cited in support of that statement deals
only with an interest in mountain cabins given to the wife
in lieu of alimony as a source of income.

She did not hold

title to the property. See Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240
P 2d 1211 (1952).

Attorneys for appellant have been unable

to find any Utah case applying the statute to modify a
property settlement. 3

~Cases

applying 30-3-5 or its predecessors to modify decrees,
include: Whitmore v. Hardin, 3 Utah 121, 1 P. 465 (1881)
recognized the use of the statute to terminate a wife's use
ponsored by
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.household
Funding for digitization
by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
ofthethe
matrimonial
upon provided
remarriage.
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Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45 Utah 625, 148 P. 362 (1915), applied th
statute to allow alimony modification where the decreer·'
based upon the agreement of the parties.
~
CQ~. C~, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952 (1916) held the stat•r
allu,.,edffiodification to grant alimony where none had been
granted in the original decree.

Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 1050, 193 P.1093 (1920) found
petition sufficient to support a modification of al~o~.
Myers v. Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 P.123 (1923) detennineda
motion to modify alimony could not affect past due install·
ments.
Chaffee v. Chaffee, 63 Utah 283, 225 P.81 (1928) reverseL
decision in favor of a petition seeking reduction of suppo:
payments and reduction of the amount of installment paymen
of lump sum alimony.
Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah 261, 236 P.457 (1925) dealt
with a petition to reduce alimony and child support.
Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1 , 47 P.2d 894 (1935) heLl ~c
a material and permanent change of circUII1stances was neces:
to reduce alimony payments.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, &9 Utah 554, 58 P.2d 11 (1936) held
that a modification of alimony could not be had in the
absence of changed condition.
Larsen v. Daynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P. 2d 785 (1943) decide
the statute allowed the court to delay disposition of
property in settlement to allow the parties to negotiate.
Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P. 2d 132 (1946)
considered an application to modify custody and alimony.
Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952) aaj~~
the management of certain property, the income of which w;
given in lieu of alimony.
Harrison v. Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 450 P.2d 456 (1969)
allowed modification of a decree for clarification.
Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) considered the pr
priety of a scheduled reduction of periodic alimony.
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Some Utah opinions have approached the question,
however, or similar questions.

In Lyon v.

~Q.

115

Utah 446, 206 P.2d 148 (1949) Justice Wolfe, in considering
whether a portion of a decree was dischargeable in bankruptcy as providing for property settlement, or not dischargeable as providing for alimony, treated dischargeability and modifiability as separate questions, and
specifically noted that the court expressed no opinion on
the modifiability of property settlements.

206 P.2d at 152.

Two more recent cases Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429
P.2d 35 (1967) and Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah
1974) have applied modification powers to affect the award
of "use and occupancy" of a house, both cases explicitly
noting that the titles to the homes remained in joint
tenancy.

429 P.2d at 36 and 526 P.2d at 1127.
Some Utah opinions have expressly assumed that

property settlements are not modifiable.

In Callister

v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 444 (1953) the
3 Dehin v. Dehin, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) applied the
modification powers to alimony and support provision.
Strong v. Strong, 548 P.2d 626 (Utah 1976) considered
modification of alimony and support payments.
Cummings v. Cummings, 562 P.2d 229 (1977) dealt with reduction
o1 support and alimony.

-17-
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appellant alleged that the payments modified by the lower
court were not alimony, but part of a property settlemen'.
and thus not modifiable.

The court treated the objectioo

substantial, apparently recognizing the nonmodifiability
rule.
In Scott v. Scott, 19 Utah 2d 267, 430 P.2d58~
(1967) this court applied :Nevada law but referred to rek
Utah authority in Lyon and Callister, supra, for the pro·
position that a property settlement is not subject to
modification.
There is, therefore, no dispositive case indi·
eating the Utah position on modifiability of property set'
men ts. No cases allow modifiability, and no cases express:
reject it.

However, the above cases indicate an implicit

recognition of the non-modifiability rule, the rule in
every other jurisdiction which has ruled upon the same.
Persuasive policy considerations compel adherenc
to the rule of non-modifiability of property settlements.
Where a judgment, on its face, gives no indication that ti
property awarded is subject to further control of the cou:
no such control should be allowed. Unless the award is of
"use and occupancy" or unless a trust is clearly imposed,
there should be no allowance of subsequent judicial t~·
pering with title.
The judgment should be entitled to full faith
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and credit in accordance with its terms.

The parties should

be able to freely deal with property which they receive.
Third parties should be able to rely on the face of the
decree when dealing with parties to a divorce and their
property.

Particularly in real property, marketability and

freedom of alienation is important.

As a case in the

domestic relations area has stated,
[I]t is also the policy of the law, insofar
as consistent with principles of justice
and equity, to keep land titles clear and
to encourage alienability of property rather
than the contrary. ~oy~2 v. Bo~gs, 10 Utah
2d 203, 208, 350 P.2 6
(1960 .
The problems resultant from

allowi~g

modification

of lump sum property awards in lieu of alimony would
seriously burden the security of divorced persons and
those who deal with them.

If property in their hands

were always subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the
courts with the possibility of divestment always present
complete inability to alienate property, or even use it
as security, would result.
Allowing modification would place a cloud on the
title of all property ever held by a divorced person. In
order to convey clear title to property a divorced person
would be required to obtain the signature of the former
spouse.

Conveyances of such property already made would be

questioned.
The consequences of the rule followed by the
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lower court, that property settlements are freely m~G
fiable, would be unjust as to the divorced parties and
severely disruptive of third parties' rights.

To affil'!!

ruling of the trial court is to burden our cou r t

S

·

With tr.

duty to endlessly reajudicate rights which should be fixi.
at the time of divorce, and to cast a cloud over all tit!,
ever held by parties to divorce.
B.

Ordering Mrs. Wright to Pay the Mortgage Debt
Was Clearly Contrary to Law
----At the hearing on the motion for continuance to

allow discovery, Judge Burns inquired, "Who's making the
payments on the house at this time?"

Finding Mr. Wright"

making the payments, the Court stated.
[T)his matter will be continued for
thirty days during which the plaintiff
[Hrs. Wright) will make payments on the
home.
T (October 8, 1971) 7:10-11.
The discovery was not completed within thirty days, howev1
as Mr. Wright took three months to answer the interroga·
tories.

But Mrs. Wright continued to make the payments o:

the house because the Order (drafted by counsel for Mr.
Wright)

d~d

not incorporate the thirty day limit but

stated she was to make payments on the mortgage "pending 1
final determination" of the matter.

R.36.

After having complied with Mrs. Wright's request
for discovery, Mr. Wright took no further steps
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to prosecute the case.

Having been relieved of support and

~ortgage obligations, he had no desire to proceed.

Mrs. Wright set the matter for trial.

Finally,

Judge Ruggeri heard

the matter and failed to relieve Mrs. Wright of the obligation to pay the mortgage.

Re found an agreement on the part

of Mrs. Wright to make the r:i.ortgage payments based upon the
prior order of the court granting a continuance.

R. 70.

We

would call the Court's attention to the order granting continuance.

R.36.

There is nothing in this order that even

implies an agreement on the part of Mrs. Hright.
Furthermore, reviewing the transcript wherein Judge
Burns relieved Xr. Wright of his duty to pay his mortgage
debt it is clear that the decision was reached without
one scintilla of evidence being taken.

T (October 8, 1971)

1-10. Note the decision of Judge Ruggeri was also reached
without his taking any evidence on this issue.

He instead

relied upon his predecessor Judge Burns, who likewise did not
hear any evidence from witnesses, only the arguments of
counsel.
While the Utah statute (§30-3-5) gives broad
modification powers, the statute clearly requires a change
of circumstance be shown to support a modification.

The

Utah Court has construed this statute as requiring a
substantial change in the material circu.~stances of the
parties.

Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189, 191 (Utah 1975).
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.
Where there is no material and perma_!:1~nt change of condition, the decree may not be modified.

Hamilton v.

--

!:lamilton, 89 Utah 554, 58 P. 2d 11 (1936), Carson v. Carsor
87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 894 (1935), and cases cited therein.

This Court has further said that notwithstanding
the equitable powers of the district courts in divorce
matters, and the broad discretion they possess, they may c
"act arbitrarily, or on supposition or conjecture as
to facts upon which to justify its order."

Iverson v.

Iverson."

If, in the

526 P.2d 1126, 1127 (Utah 1974).

absence of evidence of changed condition the court is
powerless to modify a decree

then certainly in the absenc,

of any evidence a modification is invalid.
The order requiring Mrs. Wright to make payment1
on the mortgage, under which she paid $3,951.17 must be
reversed, since it was not based upon any evidence of
changed circumstances, but upon Judge Ruggeri' s assumptior.
that the parties had agreed to it and that it was a con·
dition of Judge Burn' s Order granting Mrs. Wright a contio.
to conduct discovery.

There is simply no reference at

all in the record before the Court that Judge Burns required Mrs. Wright's payments of the mortgage as a conditr
to his granting the continuance or that both counsels for
the parties agreed to this modification.

Respondent may
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argue other.vise, but the record shows only that Mrs.
Wright requested a continuance, not that granting the
sa=ie was conditioned upon payment of the mortgage payEJents.
Finally if this Court finds that the District
Court made the modification a condition to granting a continuance to conduct discovery, then this Court must still
reverse that Order based upon the rule of the Iverson case
set forth above that the court was without power to modify
absent evidence of changed condition.
POINT II THE EVIDENCE DID NOT JUSTIFY
MODIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
Even if this Court accepts Mr. Wright's contention, adopted by the lower court, that the statute in
question (Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5) allows modification of
vested property rights, it is clear that the facts alleged
and present did not justify modification.
There is, of course, no case law on the factual
showing necessary to modify property settlements because
such modifications are universally prohibited.

However, the

factual showings required to modify alimony may be useful by
analogy.

Such factual considerations include the same

factors considered by the court in the setting of alimony
such as the parties' respective age, health, work experience,
and the duration of the marriage.

These factors might be

relevant at modification of a property settlement as well.
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However, the additional factors considered in
modification of alimony are not so persuasive.

These

include changes in the financial circumstances of the
parties such as permanent changes in the husband's earnin[
assets, or obligations, the husband's retirement, a change
in the wife's earnings or assets, increases in cost of
living, changes in childrens needs, misconduct or remani;
See, generally, 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation !!bi
694 (1966) and Clark Domestic Relations§l4. 9 (1968).

Thei

factors all relate to income and support resources and
needs.

Because property settlements are not for income ar

support, however, these factors are of limited value.
Property settlements serve to equitably divide

t

marital property and therefore factors relative to a chan5
in relative possession and accumulation of assets should
have been considered in order to justify a reapportionment
of the property settlement.

The same factors relevant to

the division of property in the beginning should have been
fully reconsidered if there was to be a modification.
However, discovery on these matters was denied. by the coui
There was no way for Mrs. Wright to counter Mr. Wright's
evidence of non-use with evidence of their relative financ.
conditions and the lack of change therein because she
was denied access to all such evidence.
was i=aterial.

The court felt it

But it clearly was material, and failure

to consider such evidence requires a reversal of the modi·
fication as factually unsubstantiated.
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The factors which were considered were clearly
insufficient.

The court's findings state that the basis for

modification of the decree was that "the use of the house by
the Plaintiff for the benefit of herself and the union
children has now been extinguished."

R.69. Further, the

court found the house was no longer needed by them.

R.70.

The court then concluded that there had been a substantial
change of circumstances.

Id.

The court's decision, on one hand appears to
treat the question as if Mrs. Wright had been awarded the
mere use and occupancy of the house, though the face of
the decree indicates much more than an award of mere

~.

On the other hand the court recognized that title was in
Mrs. Wright.

R.69.

In the judge's view, since Mrs. Wright's

use of the house had ceased, title should be taken. from
her and re-apportioned between her and her former husband.
Appellant requests that the Court review the Divorce
Decree.

R.11.

It clearly shows that the only party denomi-

nated as having an interest in the home is Mrs. Wright.
Furthermore, the assertion that the Decree awards
Mrs. Wright a mere use and occupancy of the house is absolutely rebutted by the Quit Claim Deed from Orval Wright
to Donna B. Wright, "wife of grantor, as her sole and separate
property," conveying the property in question to appellant.
R.64.

This deed on its face indicates that it was recorded
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the same day that the divorce action between '1
,. r. and Mr:
\Jright was filed.

Nr. Wright gave this deed to Mrs. Hr:

in consideration for Hrs. \fright conveying to Mr. Wright
of the rer:i.aining real property of the parties (with the
exception of four undeveloped lots).

These deeds were,

g iven before the divorce action ';as filed.

R · 6'1~ ·

Respo:

although aware of this evidence, would have the Court ig:
it to achieve a grossly unjust result.
The lower court was T"ade aware of the foregoing
evidence the day following the modification hearing. Th,
court had the power under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. to allowtt
introduction of these deeds into evidence.

On its face,

Appellant contends that these documents would have manda:
a contrary result to that reached by the lower court, but
the lower court chose to ignore this evidence.
Even under the lower court's view that property
settlements are modifiable, the court failed to consider
relevant evidence .in two aspects.

One, evidence of rela·

tive financial condition of the parties at the time of
divorce and at the time of the modification hearing. Twc ·
evidence that demonstrated that Hr. Wright had conveyed
fee simple title to the property in question to Hrs. Hrigi
The modification is therefore without any evidentiary sup:
POI:JT III

THE DE:HAL OF DISCOVERY CAUSED
A SUBSTA:JTIAL INJUSTICE

In pre::iaration for the I'.lodification hearing Mrs.
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Wright sought discovery of l-lr. Wright's financial situation
for the years 1965 through 1971.

Mr. Wright objected to the

proffered interrogatories on the ground that they were
immaterial.
We object to the interrogatories, they
are immaterial. T (October 8, 1971)
7:5-6.
And the court accepted the objection as to all of the
interrogatories relating to past property ownership, value
and income.

T (October 8, 1971) 8:3-23; R.36, 38.

The ruling striking the interrogatories was
erroneous on two grounds.

First, the trial court considered

the materiality of the interrogatories to the issues of the
case, when the proper test is materiality to the

subjec~

matter of the litigation and probability of leading to
discoverable matter.

Second, the matters labeled immaterial

were clearly material.
Rule 26(b)(l), U.R.C.P., specifies the scope of
discovery.
(1)
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, whether it relates.
to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge
of any discoverable matter. It is not
ground for objection that the informa~ion
sou~ht will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.
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The obvious purpose of the Rule is to allow a
party access to information which can help him present hi;
case.

The Rule does not contemplate restriction of disco"

to adr:'lissible evidence, but permits each party to familar:
itself ·with information which is of secondary importance,
discover facts which will enable further investigation.
Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39
(1967) considered the purpose of the discovery rules a~
concluded that anything relevant to the subject matter of
the lawsuit is discoverable.

The court declared that

anything which would aid in a just, easy, and early deter·
rnination of the dispute was discoverable.
The very brief interrogatories submitted by
appellant related to the description and value of land own1
by Hr. Wright in 1965 and 1971, the structure of Mr,- Wrighc
investment corporation and its ownership of land past and
present, Mr. Wright's income for the years 1962-1970, and
his interests in otl:').er businesses. The interrogatories are
reproduced in the footnote. 4
The trial court felt that the interrogatories
should be stricken if not material to the issues.

His

4 1.
State the legal description and approximate fair
market value of the land you owned on October 26, 1965.
2.
State the legal description and approximate
fair market value of the land you own now.
3. As to Island in the Sky, Inc., state:
the office:
(a) The names and addresses of
(b) The names and addresses of the direct'
(c) The names and addresses of the owners
(d) The number of shares owned by each
onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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application of the materiality of issues test in evaluating
the second interrogatory appears in the record:
THE COURT: Do you have an objection to Interrogatory Number Two.
MR. PARK: Yes, your Honor, same objection. It is
immaterial how much he owns now, also on the same
basis.
THE COURT: If he contends and alleges a change
of circumstances and he is worth several million
dollars, wouldn't it be material as to change
of circumstances and whether or not it would
be equity for him to pay off the home? T (October
8, 1971) 8:7-15.
Though the materiality of present financial
condition was apparent and recognized by the court, the
court did not recognize the equal materiality of past
financial condition.

But how could chang~, or lack of it,

be shown without proof of the
presen.!_ conditions?

origina~

as well as the

The Court failed to properly apply

its own "materiality to the issues" test.

4

And further,

The legal description and approximate
fair market value of the land owned
by the corporation on October 26, 1965;
The legal description of th.e land owned
(f)
by the corporation presently;
Attach copies of the corporate income
(g)
tax return for the years 1964 thtough
1970.
4. Attach copies of your income tax returns for the
years 1962 through 1970.
5. List your interest in all other partnerships,
Joint ventures, corporations, or business ventures that
you owned on October 26, 1965.
(e)
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that test was not the proper one to have been applied
by the court.
As stated ~~ the !~ce of.

!.b!'C. Rule " [I) t is not

ground for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at trial. .. "

Rule 26(b)(l), U.R.C.P.

Rather the test is relevance to subject matter, specific:.
including
existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and
the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
Id!
Here, the items on which discovery was sought 1,
essential to rebuttal of Mr. Wright's claim that circum·
stances had changed.

The denial of access to this evidem

prohibited her investigation at the outset, and was

pn~

error.
Denial of discovery, while generally a matter i:
the sound discretion of the trial court, will be reversed
where there is an abuse of discretion or where substantia:
prejudice results.

Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp., 483

F. 2d 3QQ (_5th Cir. 1973) stated that a trial judge's dis·
covery rulings are not sacrosanct and will be reversed if
fails to adhere to the liberal spirit of the rules.

!lotir.,

that "open disclosure of all potentially relevant infor·
rmation is the keynote of the Federal Discovery Rules" the
c;>rder of the lower court sustaining objections to certain
interrogatories was found to be substantial error, and th<
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judgment after trial was reversed.

Id.

Other courts, in considering claims for reversal
based on denial of discovery have made their consideration
apparent.

In a diversity personal injury case arising out

of an automobile accident, the plaintiff's refusal to
respond to questions at a deposition about conviction of
felonies, lesser offenses, or driving under the influence,
the trial judge held that he need not answer.

But the

appellant court reversed the case and remanded for a new
trial, stating that the error could not be called harmless.
Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F2d 499 (6th Cir. 1970).
In Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533

(8~h

Cir. 1963)

the court made it clear that denial of access to information
to which there is a right of access was an abuse of discretion, and where prejudicial would result in a reversal.
Other cases reversing judgment where pre-trial discovery had
been improperly barred include McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d
468 (4th Cir. 1972); Goldman v. Checker Taxi Co., 325 F.2d
853 (7th Cir. 1963); Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.2d 615
(D.C. Cir. 1958)

See also Rickett v. Mayer, 473 S.W. 2d

446 (Ark 1971).
Clearly, the denial of discovery below was contrary to the law and therefore an abuse of discretion.
Appellant was effectively denied her right to prepare her
defense.

Reversal of the modification is required, with
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instructions that proper discovery is to be allowed
before a re-hearing.
POI:lT IV

DENIAL OF THE POSTJUDGl·rENT MOTIONS
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Subsequent to the modification hearing Mrs.
Wright's counsel made several motions, including
(1)

a Motion to Re-open, pursuant to Rule

59(a) U.R.C.P. based upon the discovery of the deed as
discovered evidence (R.66);
(2)

a Motion for a New Trial, pursuant to

Rule 59(a)(6) on the ground that there was inadequate
evidence to show change in circumstances sufficient to
property vested for eight years away from appellant anc
such a judgraent was contrary to law (R. 72);
(3)

a Petition to Modify the Order pursuant

Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5, reciting the concealment of prop

unrelated nature of the mortgage; and property settleme
nature of the home (R.86); and
(4)

a Motion to Amend the Order apparently

prepared to satisfy the judge's conception of procedura
propriety (R.92).

The history of these past judgment motions re
the judge's ambivalence.

Whenever he denied a motion,

denied it "without prejudice to other remedies ... " (R. 7

84, 107) with the instruction to submit proper pleading
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to bring the matter before the Court.

R.68.

Once he

reversed himself, ordering a re-opening after denying
it. R.84, 85.

Then he denied re-opening again.

R.107.

These facts indicate the judge was concerned with the
procedural format of Mrs. Wright's motions, but that he
desired to allow her to present her evidence and establish
her claims.

See R.84.

Finally, the matter came before

Judge Ballif who was understandably reluctant to affect
actions taken by the previous judges.
Judge Ruggeri's ambivalence sprang from his
acceptance of Mr. Wright's claim that the property disposition or a property settlement was modifiable under Utah
law.

Though Mrs. Wright protested that property settlements

were not modifiable (R.18),

~1r.

Wright claimed they were

modifiable (R.27) and the court specifically held that
"the title and disposition of said house property [was]
still before the Court."

R.69.

Because the court

viewed property settlements as modifiable the newly discovered evidence was irrelevant in his view.

But since

the court clearly establishes that the house was part of a
property settlement, and therefore not a modifiable part
of the decree, denial of the motion to reopen, amend, and
have a new trial was clearly an abuse of judicial discretion.
The motion to reopen on the ground of newly
discovered evidence and the motion for a new trial on the
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g:?::ouncls of insu::ficient evidence anr1 a jnC6P1ent contrary,
clearly should have been granted.

The petitions to mo~G

and amend, pursuant to the statute should have been grant,
as well.

In Harris~~ Harrison, 22 Utah 2d 180, 450 P.i

456 (1969) this Court affirmed a decree modification base:
upon fraud and concealment of assets by the husband. The
petitions here alleged such facts, and therefore should h;,
been heard rather than dismissed.
In denying all these motions the lower court
essentially held the proffers insufficient as a
law, and refused to hear evidence.

matter~

Appellant contends

that the lower court misconceived the law and that it was
therefore an abuse of discretion to deny the petitions
and motions.
POI~T

V THIS CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO
HEAR THE UNRESOLVED MOTIONS

Among the motions made by Mrs. Wright to
facilitate reconsideration of the modification order an
a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6), and a
~fotion for Leave to File a Petition to Amend Court Order.

R. 72 and 92.

These motions have never been resolved by

t[,

lower court.
Motion for Leave to File Petition
The order appealed from in this case was entereu
April 5, 1977.

It made a prior order dated July 30, ll~

and entered August 5, 1975, final.

R.115.

That order
R.80

denied
a Petition
to Reopen
made
in February,
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Immediately after the denial of that February petition,
in July, Mrs. Wright filed Motion for Leave to File a
Petition to Amend (R.92), which has never been acted upon
by the Court.
Motion for New Trial
A very early motion for a new trial has also not
been acted upon.

That motion was made pursuant to Rule

59(a)(6), which allows a new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, or
on the ground that the judgment is against law.

No order,

minute entry, or note regarding this motion has ever been
entered.
Appellant did not pursue the resolution of
these motions in the lower court because the Court ordered
that "no other pleadings [be] filed ... except a Notice of·
Appeal."

R.115.

Appellant feels that lower court resolution

of these motions, with proper instructions from this
Court as to the law of modifiability of decrees, is an
action this Court could consider as an alternative to reversing
the modification.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the protracted term of this litigation
respondent has steadfastly argued to the lower court "that
the District Court retains jurisdiction of the parties to
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modify the decree of divorce with respect to the distribution of property." R. 27.

Counsel for respondent assert

that the Utah Supreme Court had taken this position and
furthermore,

that the Supreme Court has decided that a

pro?erty settlement incorporated into a decree is modifia
upon a showing of change of circumstances. R. 28.

Clearly

respondent's theory of Utah law, that property settlement
are modifiable, was adopted by the trier of fact.
The trier of fact specifically found "that the
title and disposition of said home is still before the
court." Finding of Fact, R. 69.

The judge further found

"that the use of the home by the Plaintiff for the benefi
of herself and the minor children has now been extinguish1
Finding of Fact, R. 69.

The court further found a change 1

circumstances. Finding of Fact, R.70.

Counsel for the

respondent admits that this is the theory upon which the

trier of fact modified the divorce decree, in effect vesti
a one-half (1/2) interest in the home in question in Mr.
Wright. At a post"'judgment hearing before Judge Ballif,
respondent's coilllsel asserted:

[I]f, in fact, that property settlement is unmod
ifiable, or the conveyance prior to the divorce by deed
can't be changed by a trial judge, I would suppose that th
Supreme Court should decide and tell us if we are wrong. h
THE COURT:
Is that your theory in that case, t
it was something that could by changed, dei:endin~ upon Ma
chan<re in circumstances such as is done with alimony, r.
Park?
'
·14
.
MR PARK: That's correct, your Honor. T (Apn
1977) 2Q:l9-28.
The trier of fact should have been appraised
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that the Utah Supreme Court had never expressly decided
the issue of the modifiability of a property settlement
agreement where absolute title to the property had passed
to one of the parties.

Furthermore, the lower court

failed to see the distinction between the award of "use
and occupancy" and the award of title.

In the court's

view all property settlements were modifiable and hence
"the title and disposition of said house is still before
the Court".

R.69.

Because the court viewed the property

settlement as modifiable the additional evidence that
Mr. Wright had conveyed the property in question to
Mrs. Wright as her sole and seuarate property (R.64) was
immaterial.
Judge Ballif perceived this distinction and
commented:
In any event, I would like to hear froCT
you and hear your view in what way you
were able, from either testimony or just
the manner in which you showed an interest
on the part of Mr. Wright in this property.
As I read the stipulation for the entry
of divorce, ·the only party who was denominated as hav·ing any interest in the home
was Donna B. Wright, and there was also a
phrase "and the children". I do.not see.
anything anywhere or any.deed which r~tained
any interest in Orval Wright. T (April 4,
1977) 4:13-21.
The only sensible interpretation of Utah Code
Ann. 30-3-5 as it applies to the distribution of property
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is that it only affects or makes modifiable awards of
"use and occupancy".

For this Court to rule otherwise

creates severe clouds on the oarketability and alienabili:
of real property of divorced persons.

The SunreTie Court

of the states of California, Oregon and Wyoming, realizino

'

the difficulties that would be caused by a contrary
rule, have decided that property settlements in divorce
decrees are not modifiable.

Similarly, by way of legis-

lation the states of Arizona, Colorado, 1'1ontana, Nevada
and Washington have reached the same result.

Appellant

urges the Court to adopt the rule of non-modifiability of
property settlement agreements as was implied by prior
Utah Supreme Court decisions in the cases of Scott,
and Callister, supra.

~

The rule of every other jurisdictio:

that has decided this issue should be adopted.
Furthermore, should this Court be inclined to
find that the Property Settlement Agreement involved herei:
is of the type that is modifiable, the lower court failed
to articulate a test to measure the circumstances under
which modification would be justified.

The trial court

apparently felt that the proper test was one of "change
or circumstances".

R. 70.

This was based solely upon the

fact that the children of the marriage had reached the age
of maturity and the appellant no longer needed the home.
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This was essentially the extent of respondent's testimony
at the modification hearing.
p. 3.

See Affidavit of Attorney,

Since property settlements serve to equitably divide

marital property the same factors relevant to the division
of property in the beginning should have been fully reconsidered if there was to have been a modification.

Because

of the lower court's failure to articulate a test to determine
when property settlements will be modifiable and to hear
evidence in relation thereto, the finding that sufficient
cause exists for a modification in this case should be reversed.
It should be noted that Mrs. Wright was denied
discovery of the parties' relative financiai conditions and
the amount of change therein due to a pre-trial ruling of
the lower court that all such evidence was immaterial.

If

the Supreme Court holds that property settlements are modifiable and that one of the relevant considerations in determining if a modification should be granted is whether or not
there have been changes in the relative financial conditions
of the parties, then the Supreme Court should reverse the
lower court to allow the discovery of this evidence and
give appellant the opportunity to present the fruits of
her discovery at another modification hearing.
The appellant filed interrogatories approximately
four months after the filing of respondent's Order to Show
Cause in. this matter.

The thrust of the interrogatories
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was to determine Mr. Wright's financial condition in
the year of the divorce (1965) through th e present (1971)
The lower court sustained Mr. Wright's objection to
all of the interrogatories relating to past property,
ownership, value and income on the grounds of irmnateriali:
In doing so, the court substantially impaired appellant's
ability to discover e-vidence essential to rebut Mr. Wright
claim o~ changed circumstances.

Beyond a doubt, the lowe:

court committed reversible error.
The questions asked were clearly material.

filtl

out proof of the original as well as the present condition
how could change or lack of it, be shown.

By a ruling of

immateriality the court made it impossible for appellant
to ever rebut a change of _circumstances.

Furthermore, as

a matter of law, the court applied an erroneous test to
determine materiality.

The record is clear that the trial

court considered materiality of the interrogatories as
it related to the issues of the case _instead of relevancy
to the subject matter of the lawsuit.

Applying this test

to the interrogatories before the court they were clearly
proper and should have been answered.

Assuming for the

sake of argument that this Court rules against the appella:
on each issue as set forth in this Conclusion, this Court
should still reverse the modification granted herein on tr.
grounds that the denial of discovery caused a substantial
injustice to the appellant, with instructions that proper
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discovery is to be allowed before a re-hearing.
After reviewing the record T (October 8, 1971) of
the hearing at which Mr. Wright's obligation to pay the
monthly mortgage payments on the home in question (incurred
to finance property kept by Mr. Wright) was changed to
an obligation of Mrs. Wright, one can only conclude that
the result reached by the trier of fact was legally impermissible.

The transcript of this hearing is devoid of

any reference to the testimony of any witnesses.

No

evidence was taken by the court.
The modification of the Divorce Decree switching
the obligation to pay monthly mortgage payments required a
showing of a substantial change in material circumstances of
the parties.

As indicated in the body of this brief, the

Supreme Court of Utah has already ruled that in the absence
of evidence of change of conditions the Court is powerless
to modify the decree.

Since no evidence was taken by the

trier of fact before reaching his decision to modify the
Decree, the modification is invalid.
Two other grounds for substantiating this modification by the trial court may be proffered.
the parties or their counsel agreed to it.

One, that

Again, if the

record of this hearing is reviewed no statement will be found
that even implies an agreement to switch the obligation to
make monthly mortgage payments.

Two, that the trialocourt
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made it a condition of granting Mrs. Wright a continuance
conduct discovery.

If such were a condition there is

nothing in the record of this hearing to indicate that
counsel for Mrs. Wright was aware that it was a condition
more importantly that he consented to the imposition of
condition.

ti

If the lower court sua sponte made modificati!

a condition to granting a continuance to conduct discover;
then that court has acted arbitrarily and again violated:
rules set down by the Utah Supreme Court that a trier of
fact is without power to modify absent evidence of change
condition.
The denial by the lower court of all of the
postjudgment motions made by appellant, under the circlllil·
stance, was an abuse of judicial discretion. Innnediately
after making his decision the trier of fact was made aware
of the deed whereby Mr. Wright conveyed the property in
question to Mrs. Wright as her sole and separate property.
He had a copy of this deed before him.

Clearly this deed

coupled with the motions filed by appellant's counsel
set forth substantial grounds which if proven mandated
revers al of the court's modifications.

One ground alleged

was that if title to the home had not been conveyed to
Mrs. Wright, then extrinsic fraud had been committed upon
the parties and the court.
From the record, it is clear that the court
did not know how to respond to these motions.

In one
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instance the court denied the motion, reversed itself
granting the motion and allowing the introduction of evidence; and finally overruling itself denying its own order
to re-open.

In each instance where a motion was denied it

was denied without prejudice and appellant was encouraged to
file further motions.

Furthermore, since there are two

motions unresolved at the trial court level, appellant has
the right to the resolution of these motions as well as the
other motions which the appellant filed.

Appellant feels

that lower court resolution of these motions with proper
instructions from this Court as to the law of modifiability
of decrees is an alternative to reversing the decision of
the lower court.
Finally, to allow the decision made by the lower
court in favor of modification to stand creates a gross
inequity.

All of the pleadings in the divorce matter, in-

cluding the Property Settlement Agreement and the deeds used
to convey the parti.es' property were drafted by Mr. Wright's
attorney upon terms dictated by Mr. Wright.

The agreement

for property settlement commences:
Wishing to respect my wife's desire for
a separation, wishing to do everything
possible to alleviate her tension, to
contribute in every way to her peace of
mind and happiness, I agree as follows
to the distribution of our property
rights;
(R,. 4.).
rhe agreement then enumerates what Mr. Wright agrees to give
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to his wife and is executed by him.

An acceptance of

Mr. Wright's offer of settlement was then executed by
Mrs. '../right.

Prior to the execution of the Property Sett

ment Agreement, on instruction from Hr. Wright, Mr. Wrio·,.
counsel had prepared deeds to the real property to be
retained by Mr. Wright which }!rs. Wright was urged to
execute.

These deeds were delivered to Mr. Wright con-

ter:rporaneously with the execution of the Property Settlet
AgreeI!lent by Mr. Wright.

The following day Mr. Wright

conveyed the property in question to Nrs. Wright as her

1

and separate property.
It is self apparent that the Property SettlemenAgreement and deeds were given in consideration of each
party receiving respective interests in real and personal
property.

}!ore than five years later Mr. Wright comes

to the Court and asks for a larger piece of the matr.imonL
pie.

To allow a redistribution of vested property intere;

under these circumstances is an extremely inequitable
result.

Appellant would request that the Court consider t

equities of the parties in reaching its decision.
For the reasons set forth in this Conclusion,

Appellant would request reversal of the order requiring ai

to make monthly mortgage payments on her home, and since:

mortgage on the same has been paid in full for an order fr

this Court requiring respondent to reimburse appellant for
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the payments made by appellant upon a showing by appellant
of the amount paid; and reversal of the judgment declaring
respondent to own an interest in her home.

Alternatively,

appellant requests that the two modifications made by
the lower court herein be reversed and the matter be remanded
to the trial court with instructions as to the applicable
law.

Furthermore, appellant requests an award of costs.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of March,

1978.

FRANK A. ALLEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this 3rd day of
March, 1978, I did mail two copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Michael W. Park, attorney
for respondent, 110 North Main Street, Cedar City, Utah,
84720, postage prepaid.

SECRETARY
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APPENDIX
----·
LAWS OF THE WESTERN STATES ON
MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREES
Arizona
Ariz. Rev Stat §25-327(A)
Except as otherwise provided ... the provisions of
any decree respecting maintenance 'Jr support may be modified
only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion
for modification and only upon a showing of changed circumstances which are substantial and continuing. The provisions
as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified,
unless the court finds the existence of conditions that
justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this
state.
California
Cal. Civ. Code §480l(a)(7)
Any order for support of the other party may be
modified or revoked as the court may deem necessary, except
as to any amount that may have accrued prior to the date of
the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to
modify or revoke.
Cal. Civ. Code §48ll(a) and (b)
(a) The provisions of any agreement between the
parties for child support shall be deemed to be separate and
severable from all other provisions of such agreement relating to property and support of the wife or husband. All
orders for child support shall be law-imposed and shall be
made under the power of the court to make such orders. All
such orders for child support, even when there has been an
agreement between the parties on the subject of child support,
may be modified or revoked at any time at the discretion of
th~ court, except as to any amount that may have accrued
prior to the date of filing of the notice of motion or order
to show cause to modify or revoke.
(b) The provisions of any agreement for the
support of either party shall be deemed to be separa~e and
severable from the provisions of the agreement relating to
property. All orders for the support of either party based
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on such agreement shall be deemed law-imposed and shall be
deemed made under.t~e power of the court to make such
orders. The provisions of any agreement or order for the
support o~ either party.shall be subject to subsequent
modification or revocation by c?urt order, except as to any
amount that may h~ve accrued prior to the date of filing of
the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or
revoke, and e~cept to.the extent that any written agreement,
or if there is no written agreement, any oral agreement
entered into in open court between the parties, specifically
provides to the contrary.
Colorado
Colo. Rev. Stat. §14-H-122(1)
Except as otherwise provided ... the provisions of
any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified
only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion
for modification and only upon a showing of changed circumstances
so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable. The provisions as to property disposition may not be
revoked or modified unless the court finds the existence of
conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment.
Idaho
Idaho Code §32 - 706
Where a divorce is granted for an offense of the
husband, including a divorce granted upon the husband's
complaint, based upon separation without cohabitation for
five (5) years, the court may compel him to provide for the
maintenance of the children of the marriage, and to make
such suitable allowance to the wife for her support as the
court may deem just, having regard to the circumstances of
t~e parties respectively; and the court may, from time to
time, modify its orders in these respects.
Montana
Montana Rev. Codes Ann §48 -330 (1)
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (6) of
48-320,the provisions of any decree respecting
maintenance or support may be modified by a court only as to
l~sta~lments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and either:
(a) upon a showing of changed circumstances so
substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable;
or
se~tion
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(b) upon written consent of the parties. The
provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or
modified by a court, except:
(i) upon written consent of the parties, or
(ii) if the court finds the existence of
conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under
the laws of this state.
Nevada
Nevada Rev. Stat. §125.150(5)
If the court adjudicates the property rights of
the parties, or an agreement by the ~arties settling their
property rights has been approved by the court, whether or
not the court has retained jurisdiction to modify the same,
such adjudication of property rights, and such agreements
settling property rights, may nevertheless at any time
thereafter be modified by the court upon written stipulation
duly signed and acknowledged by the parties to such action,
and in accordance with the terms thereof.
New Mexico
N.M. Stat. Ann.

§22-7-6(c)

The court may modify and change any order in
respect to the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance or
education of the children, whenever circumstances render
such change proper. The district court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the guardianship,
care, custody, maintenance and education of the children,
and with reference to the property decreed or funds created
for their maintenance and education, so long as they, or any
of them remain minors. If any of the property decreed or
funds created for the maintenance and education of the
children shall remain on hand and be undisposed of at the
time the minor children reach the age of majority, the same
may be disposed of by the court as it may deem just and
proper.
Oregon
Or. Rev. Stat. 107 .135 (1) and (2)
(1) The court has the power at any time after a
decree of annulment or dissolution of marriage or of separation. is granted, upon the motion of either party and af~er
service of notice on the other party in the manner provided
by law for service of a summons, to:
iii
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(a) Set aside, alter or modify so much of
the decree as may provide for the appointment and duties of
trustees, for the custody, support and welfare of the minor
children, or for the support of a party; and
(b) Make an order, after service of notice
to the other party, providing for the future custody, support
and welfare of minor children residing in the state, who, at
the time the decree was given, were not residents of the
state, or were unknown to the court or were erroneously
omitted from the decree.
(2) The decree is a final judgment as to anv
installment or payment of money which has accrued up to the
time either party makes a motion to set aside, alter or
modify the decree, and the court does not have the power to
set aside, alter or modify such decree, or any portion
thereof, which provides for any payment of money, either for
minor children or the support of a party, which has accrued
prior to the filing of such motion.
Washington
Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. §26.08.110
Such decree as to alimony and the care, custody,
support and education of children may be modified, altered
and revised by the court from time to time as circumstances
may require. Such decree, however, as to the dissolution of
the marital relation and to the custody, management and
division of property shall be final and conclusive upon both
parties subject only to the right to appeal as in civil
cases, and provided that the trial court shall at all times
including the pendency of any appeal, have the power to
grant any and all restraining orders that may be necessary
to protect the parties and secure justice.
Wyoming
Wyo. Stat. §20-66.
After a decree for alimony or other allowance for
the wife and children, or either or them, and also after a
decree for the appointment of trustees to receive and hold
any property for the use of the wife or children, the court
may, from time to time, on the petition of either of
the parties, revise and alter such decree respecting the
amount of such alimony or allowance, or the payment thereof
and respecting the appropriation and payment of the principal

iv
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AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH
SS.

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON
FRANK A. ALLEN, being duly sworn, deposes and
says:
1.

That affiant is an attorney licensed to

practice law within the State of Utah and is counsel for
the Appellant herein.
2.

That affiant filed the Notice of Appeal

herein and within a reasonable time thereafter contacted
Byron Ray Christiansen to obtain a

transcr~pt

of the original

divorce proceeding heard in the Fifth Judicial District
Court, Washington County, State of Utah, on October 8, 1965;
Ned Greenig to obtain a transcript of the Order to Show Cause
hearing held in said court, October 1, 1973; John Greenig to
obtain a transcript of the October 17, 1973 hearing on the
Motion to Re-open and to obtain a transcript of the July 23,
1975 hearing on the Motion to Re-open held in the same Court.
3.

That on August 1, 1975 affiant was advised

by Byron Ray Christiansen that he was unable to locate his
stenographic notes of the original divorce hearing on October
8, 1975 and therefore would not be able to produce a transcript
of said hearing.

A copy of said letter is attached hereto

a,s Schedule A and incorporated herein by reference.
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4.

That affiant made numerous attempts to

obtain the aforesaid transcripts from Mr. Ned Greenig
and Mr. John Greenig and was finally advised that said
reporters had lost their stenographic notes and would
be unable to produce transcripts of said hearings.

S.

That Mr. Ned Greenig and Mr. John Greenig

advised affiant that they would produce an Affidavit to
the effect that said notes could not be located but to
date saici reporters have failed to provide affiant with
an Affidavit.
6.

That the failure of the aforesaid reporters

to provide transcripts has considerably delayed the filing
of Appellant's brief herein.
DATED this

J. "''Y . day

of March, 1978.

~a.JO{OL

FMNKA-:-ALLEN_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

-; 1~'CL

day of March, 1978.
,--~

\,:cc~ .. Y'
·-1 ~ii
.(I,·-.); <,I
(NOTARYPUBLIC
Residing at St. George, Utah

- <1

My commission expires:
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SCHEDULE "A"

August 1, 1977

Frank A. Allen
Attorney at Law
148 East Tabernacle
st. George, Utah 84770
Dear Mr. Allen:
Re: Donna B. Wright vs.
Orval Wright
Civil No. 3456
Pursuant to your designation of record on appeal in the
above-captioned matter you designated a copy of transcript
of the original divorce hearing on October 8,,1965.
I have searched the Washington County Archives where my
stenographic notes are stored, and I am unable to locate
designated stenograph notes and therefore will be unable
to produce a transcript of said October 8, 1965 hearing.
I was able to locate my stenographic notes of October 8,
1971 and November 16, 1973, and transcripts of these dates
have been filed with the Washington County Clerk.
I am very sorry for this inconvenience and if you have any
suggestions please so contact me.

cc: Washington County Clerk
Michael W. Park, Esq.
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